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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile events from the Columbia space shuttle disaster and Catholic Church sex scandal to the debacles at major U.S.
corporations and financial institutions have caused a renewed interest in the subject of organizational misconduct.1 Yet we still know
* Visiting Professor, University of Virginia School of Law; Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Krawiec@email.unc.edu. I thank workshop participants at Harvard
Business School, Boston University Law School, and Roger Williams University Law
School, and fellow panelists and audience members at the American Constitution Society’s
Annual Convention and at a symposium on The Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institutions
held at Florida State University for helpful input on this paper. I also thank Amitai Aviram, Barbara Banoff, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Mihir Desai, Frank Dobbin, Vicki Jackson, Vik
Khanna, Anne Lawton, Joshua Margolis, Greg Mitchell, Laura Morgan Roberts, Phil Tetlock, David Walker, David Wilkins, and Michael Yelnosky for comments and suggestions.
1. John Schwartz & Matthew L. Wald, Report on Loss of Shuttle Focuses on NASA
Blunders and Issues Somber Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at A1 (quoting a report
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that blames NASA’s “broken safety culture”
for the Columbia disaster); DAVID FRANCE, OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL (2004) (discussing the role of the Catholic
Church hierarchy in sustaining and covering up the sexual misconduct of numerous
priests). Organizational misconduct—conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the organization—should be distinguished from occupational misconduct—conduct undertaken
solely to benefit the perpetrator and in which the organization may actually be the victim.
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relatively little about this extremely important subject. For example,
what induces large and important segments of an organization to engage in or ignore deviant behavior? What does and should our legal
system do to deter such behavior? Are we currently doing enough?
This Article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) in 1991, the U.S. legal
regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability.2 Under
this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependent on whether the organization has exercised due care to avoid the
harm in question, rather than on traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of
care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place “internal compliance structures” ostensibly designed to detect and discourage such conduct.3
I argue, however, that any duty-based liability system that conditions the organization’s duty on the presence of internal compliance
structures is likely to fail because courts lack sufficient information
about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal
compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of
largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct.
This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but ineffective internal compliance structures.
I then explore two possible explanations for the U.S. legal system’s move toward a compliance-based liability regime: (1) an overreliance on agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct and
(2) public choice explanations. I argue that an overreliance on agency
cost explanations for organizational misconduct and rent-seeking by
See MARSHALL B. CLINARD ET AL., CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 173 (3d ed.,
Anderson Publ’g Co. 1994) (1967) (dividing white collar crime into two types: corporate
crime and occupational crime); John Braithwaite, White Collar Crime, 11 ANN. REV. SOC.
1, 19 (1985) (same). Common examples of occupational misconduct include embezzlement
and the acceptance of kickbacks. In addition, the term “organizational misconduct” encompasses actions by all organizations, including corporations, nonprofits, and government entities, and includes not only crimes but torts and violations of the organization’s ethics or
conduct codes, even when such violations are not illegal. See, e.g., Laura Shill Schrager &
James F. Short, Jr., Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 SOC. PROBS. 407
(1978) (defining “organizational crime”).
2. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime closely approximates a rule of “pure strict vicarious liability”).
3. See infra Part III.A for a definition of the term “internal compliance structures.”
This move toward “compliance-oriented” regulation is part of a global trend. Christine
Parker, Reinventing Regulation Within the Corporation: Compliance-Oriented Regulatory
Innovation, 32 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 529, 529-30 (2000).
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powerful interest groups both contribute to the growth of internal
compliance-based liability regimes. As a result, the U.S. legal regime
is likely to continue its march toward duty-based liability regimes
that rely on internal compliance structures in assessing liability or
sanctions, because deep-rooted theoretical and political forces conspire to promote such a regime.
Part II of this Article discusses the three primary methods for assigning firm-level liability for agent misconduct: strict vicarious liability, negligence, and a composite liability regime that combines
elements of both negligence and strict liability.4 Both negligence and
composite liability regimes require a court or agency determination
regarding whether the organization has met its duty of care, typically determined by reference to the organization’s internal compliance structures. However, because courts and agencies lack reliable
information regarding the effectiveness of such structures, internal
compliance-based liability systems are likely to fail. As elaborated in
Part II, this does not mean that strict vicarious liability systems are
perfect or costless. However, many of these costs can be minimized
through evidentiary privilege rules, mitigation rules that reward reporting and cooperation after the discovery of organizational misconduct, and various other relatively mild changes to the legal regime.
Part III argues that, although the OSG is typically held out as an
ideal model of duty-based organizational liability, large and important areas of U.S. law are actually duty-based organizational liability
regimes. Indeed, in many areas of law—including environmental,
tort, employment discrimination, corporate, securities, and health
care—organizational liability for agent misconduct is determined
through either a composite regime that assigns blame based on a
strict liability standard and determines sanctions based on a negligence standard or a negligence-based regime that bases organizational liability on a finding that the organization failed to satisfy the
standard of due care. In both cases, the organization’s negligence is
determined by reference to a standard of due care that rewards organizations for (and, correspondingly, punishes organizations for the
lack of) internal compliance structures.
Part IV argues, however, that the presumed effectiveness of dutybased liability regimes that premise organizational culpability on the
presence of internal compliance structures is backed by little, if any,
empirical support. Although there has been relatively little comprehensive study of the impact of internal compliance structures on the
incidence of organizational misconduct, the available empirical evi4. Hereafter, negligence-based vicarious liability and composite liability regimes are
collectively referred to as “duty-based liability regimes,” except where the context requires
a distinction between the two.
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dence does not support the contention that the internal compliance
structures typically examined by courts and regulators in assessing
organizational due care reduce organizational misconduct. Indeed,
several large-scale empirical studies document a positive correlation
between organizational misconduct and the types of internal compliance structures most frequently relied on by courts and regulators in
assessing liability and sanctions, suggesting that some organizations
may employ internal compliance structures primarily as a windowdressing mechanism that provides both market legitimacy and reduced organizational liability for agent misconduct.
Part V explains that, rather than adopting an effective system for
deterring organizational misconduct, the U.S. legal regime may have
adopted a costly “safe harbor” that allows organizations to evade liability for organizational misconduct, so long as they have adopted
internal compliance structures.5 I then explore some possible reasons
for the legal regime’s extreme reliance on internal compliance structures in assessing organizational culpability, despite their poor empirical showing as a means of reducing organizational misconduct.
Although it is of course possible that the legal regime’s enthusiastic
embrace of internal compliance-based organizational liability is attributable to a simple misplaced faith in the effectiveness of internal
compliance structures in deterring organizational misconduct, this
Article suggests that the answer is likely far more complicated and
may be due to two factors.
First, it is possible that the legal regime’s embrace of internal
compliance structures is partly attributable to an overreliance on
agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct. In other
words, if the legal regime presumes that organizational misconduct
is simply a principal-agent problem, legal incentives that induce
principals to more carefully police their agents may be a rational response to that perceived problem.
Second, public choice theory may explain some aspects of the legal
regime’s dependence on internal compliance structures as an organizational liability determinant. As discussed in this Article, although
the implementation of comprehensive internal compliance structures
is costly to organizations, it is far less costly than actually altering
current business practices. Consequently, once public outcry makes
regulation inevitable, organizations may settle, or even push, for a
legal regime that incorporates internal compliance structures into
organizational liability determinations. In addition, other powerful
interest groups have a stake in and benefit from internal compliance5. Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (querying why corporate interests have not lobbied
for such a safe harbor from criminal liability).
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based liability regimes, particularly legal compliance professionals
such as lawyers, compliance and ethics consultants, in-house compliance and human resources personnel, and diversity trainers.
Part VI briefly addresses the possibility of holding board members
and senior management vicariously liable for the misdeeds of lowerlevel agents and warns that such liability is unlikely to effectively
substitute for organizational liability. Part VII concludes.
II. THE CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME
This Part outlines the three basic organizational liability standards for agent misconduct—strict vicarious liability, negligence, and
composite liability—and the benefits and drawbacks of each.6 I demonstrate that duty-based liability regimes that look to the presence of
internal compliance structures to determine whether the organization has met its duty of care are likely to fail, because courts lack reliable information regarding the effectiveness of such structures. As
a result, strict vicarious liability with some modifications to encourage reporting and cooperation with government investigations is superior to both negligence-based and composite liability systems for
deterring organizational misconduct and inducing the appropriate
level and type of internal enforcement measures.
A. Strict Vicarious Liability
Under a strict vicarious liability standard, organizational liability
is imposed whenever an organizational actor causes some punishable
harm, regardless of any attempts by the organization to avoid the
harm.7 The premise behind strict vicarious liability is that by forcing
6. It is generally recognized that some type of firm-level liability is necessary in order to effectively deter organizational misconduct for a variety of reasons, including the
limited assets of organizational agents, the superior ability of firm-level liability to force
the internalization of the costs of harmful activity, and the potential savings in enforcement costs. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 692 (1997) (arguing that firm-level liability addresses problems of judgment-proof agents and costly government sanctioning); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 319, 322 (1996) (arguing that firm-level liability saves on enforcement costs because,
“[r]ather than having to invest resources to penetrate the corporate hierarchy and decisionmaking structure to determine the culpability of particular individuals, the state can simply penalize the firm”). However, many scholars debate whether this liability should ever
take the form of criminal, as opposed to civil or administrative, sanctions. See Fischel &
Sykes, supra, at 322. In addition, cogent arguments can be made that vicarious liability of
senior officers and directors for organizational misconduct is, under some circumstances, a
useful complement to or substitute for organizational liability in deterring organizational
misconduct. See infra Part VI for a discussion of this argument.
7. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the organization may be held liable for
the acts of its agents undertaken with an intent to benefit the organization that are within
the ordinary scope of the agent’s employment. I refer to such agents as “organizational actors” in this Article.
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organizations to internalize all of the costs associated with their activities, the organization’s products are appropriately priced and the
socially optimal amount of the good or service is produced.8
In addition, strict vicarious liability systems may force the adoption
of the socially optimal level of internal organizational enforcement and
deterrence mechanisms (internal compliance structures). This is because when an organization bears all of the costs of any harm it
causes, it has an incentive to reduce the incidence of such harm up to
the point where the costs of such reduction equal the benefits.9
Despite these advantages, strict vicarious liability systems have
been criticized on a number of fronts for creating incentives at odds
with the goal of deterring organizational misconduct. For example,
some internal compliance structures, known as “policing measures,”
may increase the probability of detection, either because information
regarding the occurrence of misconduct may be reported to government authorities by the organization or a whistleblower or because the
government may subpoena any information regarding organizational
misconduct that has been internally generated. Accordingly, it has
been argued that under a strict vicarious liability system, organizations have an incentive to avoid implementing internal compliance
structures that might reduce the incidence of organizational wrongdoing.10 This results in increased levels of organizational misconduct and
more expensive and less effective government policing of such behavior.
In addition, some commentators argue that attempts to induce internal organizational policing under strict vicarious liability regimes
suffer from credibility problems. In other words, firms’ internal policing efforts will deter employee misconduct only if employees believe
that firms will actually employ those efforts to detect, report, and punish such misconduct. Under a strict vicarious liability system, it is argued, these threats are not credible because the firm itself will suffer
increased liability from such efforts.11

8. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 321-22; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the
Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1223-24 (2003).
9. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 703; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 324
(arguing that monitoring is desirable up to the point where the marginal cost would exceed
the marginal social gain in the form of reduced harmful activity).
10. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 840; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 708.
Arlen and Kraakman distinguish “policing” measures that deter misconduct by increasing
the probability of detection from “preventive” measures that deter misconduct by altering
the costs or benefits of misconduct but do not impact the probability of detection. Id. at
701-02. Examples of preventive measures include the firm’s compensation and promotion
policies, strict controls over cash disbursements, and strict accounting for chemical waste.
Id. According to Arlen and Kraakman, strict vicarious liability causes perverse incentive
problems with respect to policing measures but not preventive measures. Id. at 707.
11. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 712-14.
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These problems, however, are even more severe under duty-based
organizational liability systems than under strict vicarious liability
systems. As discussed in Parts II.B and C of this Article, due to the
informational disadvantages of courts and regulators regarding the
effectiveness of internal policing measures, any duty-based organizational liability system produces perverse incentives of its own. Specifically, organizations have an incentive to invest in low-cost, potentially ineffective internal policing measures that fail to reduce organizational misconduct, yet nonetheless reduce organizational liability.
More disturbing, the analysis of the empirical evidence in Part IV of
this Article suggests that many firms have adopted exactly this cosmetic approach to organizational compliance. Furthermore, employees are keenly aware of the extent to which such policing measures
are cosmetic; this can lead to potentially severe credibility problems
in any duty-based liability regime that relies on internal compliance
structures in assessing guilt or sanctions.12
In addition, to the extent that policing and credibility concerns are
potential drawbacks of a strict vicarious liability system, these drawbacks are surmountable and need not prevent the implementation of
successful strict (or modified strict) liability systems. Firms can still
be encouraged to engage in internal policing and cooperation with
government authorities through some combination of evidentiary
privilege rules and reduced sanctions for cooperation with government investigations. In other words, firms can be rewarded not for
the mere existence of internal compliance structures, but for ex post
demonstrations that such structures revealed useful information that
was then used to penalize those responsible for misconduct, thus presumably deterring future misconduct.
First, fears that subsequent government or third-party access to
information produced by internal compliance structures will deter
the implementation of such structures can be addressed through
12. See, e.g., MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 132-36 (1983) (concluding from interviews with sixty-four retired
managers of Fortune 500 corporations that the behavior and philosophy of top management was most commonly asserted as the primary reason for illegal employee behavior);
ETHICS OFFICER ASS’N, THE 2000 MEMBER SURVEY REPORT 30 (2001) (listing short-term financial pressures, lack of financial or staff support, and compensation system inconsistent
with corporate values as three of the top four principal obstacles to the work of ethics officers); ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2003: HOW EMPLOYEES VIEW
ETHICS IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS 31 (2003) (“Employees who perceive that their supervisors do more than ‘talk about the importance of ethics’ observe less misconduct in their organizations.”); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices, 42
ACAD. MGMT. J. 539, 547-48 (1999) (finding that top management commitment to ethical
behavior is more important in deterring misconduct than are external forces, such as the
OSG, which tend to promote only formal changes, such as the adoption of ethics codes, and
are not fully integrated into organizational activities).
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privilege rules, such as those employed by many states in connection
with internal environmental and other audits.13 Similarly, the attorney-client privilege has been successfully invoked in some cases to
shield corporate audits from discovery and disclosure.14 In other
words, rules mandating that any information produced through internal policing measures will not be used against the organization,
provided that the organization cooperates with any government investigation, could alleviate this concern and improve the deterrence
function of strict liability.15
The proper role of privilege in organizational policing and enforcement is subject to much debate. The use of such privileges
doubtless raises concerns of its own and may be more appropriate or
practical in connection with some types of violations than others.16
The point here, however, is that the most commonly advocated substitute for audit privileges—duty-based organizational liability—
presents even greater problems.17
Fears that firms will fail to implement internal policing measures
under a strict vicarious liability system can be further alleviated
through rules that reward organizations for post-offense reporting
and cooperation. For example, if organizations are offered reduced
penalties in exchange for self-detection and reporting, the incentive
to implement policing measures under a strict liability regime may
13. See, e.g., David Markert et al., Environmental Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 443,
460-62 (2004) (discussing statutory, attorney-client, and other privileges designed to protect internal corporate audits).
14. Id. at 462 n.98.
15. Professors Arlen and Kraakman refer to this version of modified strict liability as
“probability-fixed strict liability,” and they argue that it is unworkable in both practice and
theory. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 719-21. As a practical matter, they argue that
modified strict liability is unworkable because it is not “truly possible to insulate a firm
from the liability effects of its own policing efforts.” Id. at 720. However, evidentiary privileges such as these are successfully used throughout criminal law to prevent government
authorities from accessing certain information. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 9.3-.6 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the fruit of the poisonous tree
and other exclusionary rules of criminal procedure). As a theoretical matter, Arlen and
Kraakman argue that it would require prohibitively large sanctions in order to induce
firms to police against low-visibility misconduct. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 720.
However, this is true as a practical matter with respect to duty-based organizational liability regimes as well.
16. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 969 (1996) (discussing the debate over these privileges); Steven A.
Herman, NCSL Study Finds that State Environmental Audit Laws Have No Impact on
Company Self Auditing and Disclosure of Violations, NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Dec.
1998/Jan. 1999, at 18, 19 (finding that more than three-fourths of companies surveyed report performing audits without regard to the existence of audit laws, but that most also fail
to report violations, even when the state provides an audit privilege).
17. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, When Companies Come Clean:
Mitigation Is Better than Environmental Audit Privileges, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2000,
at 46 (arguing that a compliance-based organizational liability regime is preferable to the
use of internal audit privileges).
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be substantially increased. In fact, such reduced penalties in exchange for self-reporting and cooperation already exist under the
OSG and also are employed informally in connection with many investigations and prosecutions of organizational misconduct.18
In short, the problems identified by commentators in connection
with a strict vicarious liability regime are real, but they are not insurmountable obstacles to an effective strict vicarious liability regime. Several relatively minor changes to the current legal regime
(some of which have already been implemented with apparent success in certain regulatory settings) may alleviate many of the concerns expressed by critics of strict vicarious liability regimes. Finally,
as detailed in Part II.C below, internal compliance-based organizational liability regimes pose similar, and arguably more severe, problems.
B. Negligence
Under a negligence-based organizational liability regime, firmlevel liability is imposed whenever an organizational actor causes
some punishable harm and the standard of due care is not met. Typically, this means that the organization has failed to take sufficient
measures to avoid the harm; for example, it has failed to implement
training programs or other internal compliance structures or to observe industry standards regarding operating methods.
Negligence-based organizational liability regimes are considered
inferior to strict liability regimes in terms of encouraging the socially
optimal level of production, because negligence-based organizational
liability regimes do not force organizations to bear the entire cost of
their harmful conduct.19 Accordingly, goods and services produced by

18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2004) [hereinafter
SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (listing organizational cooperation in the investigation and voluntary self-reporting of the offense among several culpability factors); Shirah Neiman,
Corporate Fraud Issues II: Interview with United States Attorney James B. Comey Regarding the Department of Justice’s Policy on Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, November 2003,
United States Attorney’s Bulletin, in 2 36TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 1089 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1456,
2004) (discussing the role of corporate cooperation with prosecutors in inducing leniency);
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of
Justice 6 (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf (last
updated Nov. 15, 2004) (“In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with
the government’s investigation may be relevant factors.”).
19. See, e.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 705; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6,
at 328; Khanna, supra note 8, at 1226 (stating that “negligence standards tend to fail on
the activity level front because they do not force the firm to bear the full social costs of its
products”); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1980).
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organizations in such a regime will be underpriced, and too much
will be produced.20
Furthermore, strict vicarious liability standards are considered
superior to negligence-based organizational liability standards in
terms of inducing the optimal level of internal compliance structures.
Although negligence-based liability could in theory induce the optimal level of internal deterrence measures, it is unlikely to achieve
this goal in practice due to the difficulty of accurately determining
whether the standard of care has been met.
Judicial and agency determinations regarding whether a particular organization’s internal compliance structures meet the required
standard of due care may be faulty for a variety of reasons. First,
courts and agencies may require either too many or too few structures in setting the standard because they lack sufficient information
to make such decisions accurately.21 As a result, they may demand
internal compliance structures whose costs exceed their deterrence
benefits, which would result in social waste. Alternatively, they may
demand too few internal compliance structures, or internal compliance structures that are ineffective in deterring misconduct, resulting in underdeterrence. Second, even assuming that courts and agencies are able to accurately set the standard of care, they are likely to
misjudge whether the organization has met that standard (in other
words, whether it has adopted the appropriate number and type of
structures) in the particular case at hand.22
Finally, courts and agencies are unlikely to possess the ability to
differentiate effective internal compliance structures from cosmetic
ones—that is, those structures designed to create the illusion of compliance for purposes of avoiding legal liability, rather than for the
purpose of deterring misconduct.23 This is because differentiating
real internal compliance structures from purely symbolic ones is a
difficult task for legal decisionmakers, particularly ex post when, by
definition, the structures in question have failed to deter misconduct.
Additionally, the indicators of an effective internal compliance structure are easily mimicked, and the true level of effectiveness is difficult for any decisionmaker lacking perfect information to determine.24

20. Shavell, supra note 19, at 4.
21. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 329; Khanna, supra note 8, at 1227-28; Kimberly
D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing that because legal decisionmakers are unable to determine this
with any accuracy, internal compliance-based liability regimes tend to both underdeter
misconduct and impose socially wasteful costs on organizations).
22. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1228.
23. See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 536-37.
24. Id. at 491-92.
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This is not to imply that accurate determinations by courts and
agencies regarding whether internal compliance structures are cosmetic or real are impossible. Presumably, given sufficient amounts of
time and money, reliable determinations as to the quality of internal
compliance could be made. However, as a society, we have shown no
willingness to dedicate the extraordinary resources to courts, prosecutors, and agencies that would be necessary to perform this function. Moreover, given the lower costs and greater effectiveness of an
appropriately designed strict vicarious liability regime, this refusal is
probably wise.
C. Composite Regimes
Composite regimes are organizational liability regimes that combine elements of both strict vicarious liability and negligence. In
their most common form, composite liability regimes assign liability
based on a strict liability standard but apportion sanctions based on
a negligence standard.25 Although the OSG is typically offered as an
example of such a regime, as discussed in Part III of this Article,
large segments of the U.S. legal regime relating to organizational liability for agent misconduct are best characterized as composite regimes. Others, despite their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious
liability regimes, are actually negligence regimes, due to prosecutorial and agency discretion and judicially crafted exceptions to the
strict vicarious liability rule.
Despite the popularity of composite regimes among legal scholars
and government actors, as discussed in Part IV of this Article, little
evidence exists to support the theory that composite liability regimes
that incorporate organizational internal compliance structures into
the sanction calculation deter organizational misconduct. In fact, a
growing body of empirical evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of
such regimes.
These results should not be entirely surprising. Composite regimes, at least in practice, present all of the same incentive problems
discussed in connection with negligence regimes. In other words, negligence-based organizational liability regimes are criticized for a failure to force organizations to fully internalize the costs of their harmful activities. This same criticism, however, can be leveled at composite regimes. Strict liability regimes, after all, only force the internalization of costs if the appropriate sanction is applied.26 By reducing
25. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 717 (referring to such regimes as “mixed liability regimes”).
26. This optimal sanction is equal to the harm caused divided by the probability of detection. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines
and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
239 (1993).
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the applicable sanctions based on a factor—the presence of internal
compliance structures—unrelated to either the amount of harm or
the probability of detection, the composite regime moves away from
the optimal sanction, reducing the extent to which the sanctioned organization is forced to internalize the costs of its harmful conduct.27
In addition, negligence-based organizational liability regimes are
criticized for, at least in practice, failing to provide incentives for the
adoption of the optimal level and type of internal compliance structures. This same criticism, however, can and should be leveled at
composite regimes. As under the negligence-based regime, courts and
agencies may err in setting the standard by including too few, too
many, or an inappropriate type of internal compliance structures in
the due care standard. Furthermore, because courts and agencies
lack sufficient information regarding the effectiveness of internal
compliance structures, they are likely to err in determining whether
a particular organization has met the standard in any given case
and, in any event, are unlikely to possess the ability to differentiate
symbolic or cosmetic compliance structures, designed primarily to
avoid liability rather than to deter misconduct, from genuine ones.28
III. UNITED STATES LAW AS A COMPOSITE LIABILITY REGIME
This Part demonstrates that, although the OSG is correctly held
out as the paradigm of a composite liability regime, large and important segments of U.S. law are best characterized as composite regimes.29 Others, despite their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious
liability regimes, are actually negligence regimes due to prosecutorial
and agency enforcement discretion and judicially crafted exceptions
from the strict vicarious liability standard. In both cases, the determination of whether the organization has met the standard of due
27. Presumably, composite regimes that reward organizations for the presence of internal compliance structures do so on the assumption that such structures increase the
probability of detection, and legal scholars defend composite regimes on exactly this basis.
Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 733. As discussed in Part IV of this Article, however,
when internal compliance structures are cosmetic, rather than real, and legal decisionmakers are unable to tell the difference, internal compliance structures cannot be expected
to reduce misconduct or increase the probability of detection.
28. Krawiec, supra note 21, at 541 (arguing that not only are courts unable to make
this distinction but that a review of the caselaw demonstrates that, in many cases, they do
not even try).
29. On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines should be interpreted by judges as merely advisory, rather than mandatory, to
avoid violating criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. Booker, 125
S. Ct. 738 (2005). Although it is unclear how this ruling will impact organizational sentencing, many corporate lawyers are advising clients to continue treating the OSG as if it were
mandatory. Gary Fields, Ruling on Sentencing Guidelines May Also Affect Corporate
Crime, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at A4 (quoting one corporate counsel as stating that,
“[a]s far as corporations are concerned, the compliance guidelines are not advisory, they
are still mandatory” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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care is determined by reference to the presence of internal compliance structures. Part III.A of this Article defines the term “internal
compliance structures” and illustrates the type of internal compliance structures that are most prevalent in U.S. organizations. Part
III.B describes the role of these internal compliance structures in the
U.S. legal regime by characterizing a broad array of laws as either
composite or negligence-based liability regimes that incorporate internal compliance structures into the organizational due care assessment.
A. Internal Compliance Structures Defined
The internal compliance structures adopted by most organizations
are quite similar and are based primarily on two legal sources: the
minimum steps for an effective internal compliance system set out in
the OSG30 and equal employment opportunity (EEO) law.31 For example, the centerpiece of any internal compliance program is a written ethics or conduct code that sets forth the ostensible limits of acceptable agent conduct.32 Most large organizations also have written
EEO policies that confirm the organization’s commitment to nondiscriminatory hiring, firing, and promotion policies. Many conduct and
EEO codes also detail mechanisms of code enforcement, such as internal reporting and information-gathering procedures, policies regarding the investigation of reported violations, whistleblowing procedures and policies regarding the protection of whistleblowers from
retaliation, and internal procedures and sanctions for conduct code
violations.33

30. Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality:
Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367,
370 (2002).
31. EEO law includes a variety of statutes, rules, and regulations addressing workplace discrimination. The most important of these are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,10112,213 (2000), the rules, regulations and interpretations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and a variety of state statutes. See Elizabeth Chambliss & Lauren B.
Edelman, Sociological Perspectives on Equal Employment Law (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
32. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 8B2.1. Over ninety percent of Fortune 500 corporations and over seventy-five percent of other large corporations report having an ethics or conduct code. Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering
and Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21, 21 (1996); Gary R.
Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-1990’s: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 283 (1999).
33. Brien, supra note 32, at 21; Richard S. Gruner, Developing Judicial Standards for
Evaluating Compliance Programs: Insights from EEO Litigation, in 1 CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE 2002, at 159, 169 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. B-1317, 2002).
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Second, effective internal compliance requires that conduct and
EEO codes be communicated to the organization’s employees and
other agents. Common mechanisms for such dissemination include
training programs, organization newsletters, employee manuals, and
organizational websites.34 In the EEO context, this communication
often takes the form of “diversity” or harassment training.
Third, organizations must have monitoring and auditing systems
reasonably designed to detect prohibited conduct by organizational
agents.35 Fourth, most organizational compliance programs contain a
reporting mechanism that allows employees to report violations of
the organization’s conduct code or of laws and regulations without
fear of retaliation by others within the organization.36 This includes
internal grievance procedures designed to allow employees to express
concerns regarding discriminatory conduct. Finally, specific, highlevel personnel within the organization must be assigned responsibility for oversight of compliance with the organization’s conduct or ethics code.37
B. Internal Compliance Structures and Organizational Due Care
As widely noted, the OSG in many ways represents the prototypical composite liability regime. For all practical purposes, the OSG
requires organizations to adopt internal compliance structures by reducing to as little as one-twentieth or increasing by as much as four
hundred percent the original base fine faced by organizations convicted of a federal crime based on a variety of mitigating or aggravating factors, including the presence of organizational internal compliance structures.38 Assuming the absence of any aggravating factors,
such as involvement in the violation by high-level personnel, the
presence of “effective” internal compliance structures will result in a
reduction of the organization’s fine by up to sixty percent.39
34. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A).
35. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A).
36. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C).
37. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). In addition, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual lists as
minimum steps for an effective internal compliance system requirements that the organization use due care not to delegate authority to agents with a propensity for illegal conduct, that the organization take all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the violation and prevent future similar violations once the offense is discovered, and that the code
of conduct be consistently enforced. Id. §§ 8B2.1(b)(3), (6), (7).
38. Other culpability factors include tolerance of or participation in the violations by
high-level personnel, the organization’s prior history of similar misconduct, organizational
cooperation in the investigation, voluntary self-reporting of the offense, and whether the
organization accepted responsibility for the illegal conduct. Id. § 8C2.5.
39. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, effective internal compliance structures are those that are “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that [they] generally [will be] effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct. The failure to prevent or detect the instant offense does not necessarily mean that
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Because the OSG was one of the first major legal regimes to make
the transition from strict vicarious liability to an internal compliance-based standard, it is an extraordinarily important segment of
the internal compliance-based legal regime. However, the OSG internal compliance-based approach to organizational misconduct was
quickly emulated in other legal fields. As a result, today a wide variety of civil, criminal, and regulatory provisions encourage the adoption of internal compliance structures through duty-based vicarious
liability regimes.
For example, both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) incorporate the OSG composite liability concept by allowing reduced civil
penalties and, in some cases, no criminal penalties for organizations
with effective internal compliance structures.40 Furthermore, the
HHS guidelines for determining the existence of an effective internal
compliance program are fashioned directly after the OSG’s minimum
steps for an effective compliance program.41 In addition, the Justice
Department follows what amounts to a negligence-based organizational liability regime that considers organizations’ internal compliance structures in deciding whether to criminally charge organizations for the acts of their employees and agents.42 Similarly, state attorneys general follow a negligence approach by considering organizational internal compliance structures in making enforcement decisions.43
The judiciary has also employed compliance-based liability standards in a variety of legal contexts that amount to the creation of a
negligence-based organizational liability regime. For example, internal compliance structures may be relevant to a determination of
the program is not generally effective.” Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2). The manual goes on to list the
minimum steps that the organization must have taken in order to qualify for a reduced
sentence. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimum
steps.
40. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of policy); see also OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FRAUD PREVENTION AND
DETECTION: COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE, at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter HHS GUIDELINES] (providing links to compliance program guidance for, among others, pharmaceutical manufacturers, ambulance suppliers,
nursing facilities, and hospitals).
41. See HHS GUIDELINES, supra note 40. The Office of the Inspector General of HHS
has also required the adoption of internal compliance structures by organizations settling
health care fraud charges. See Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave
New World of Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 56 (1997).
42. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Deptartment of Justice, to
All Component Heads and United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice (June 16,
1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (last updated Mar.
9, 2000).
43. Junda Woo, Self-Policing Can Pay Off for Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1993,
at B5.
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whether an employee’s illegal or tortious conduct was undertaken
with an intent to benefit the organization and thus determine organizational civil punitive or criminal liability. Organizations may be
able to demonstrate that an employee’s conduct was not undertaken
with an intent to benefit the organization through evidence that the
organizational defendant had in place ethics codes prohibiting the
relevant conduct and compliance programs ostensibly designed to detect violations.44
Corporate and securities law also contain elements of composite or
negligence-based organizational liability regimes that provide an incentive for the adoption of internal compliance structures. Section
15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act, for example, authorizes
the SEC to suspend or revoke the registration of any broker/dealer
that “has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing
violations of the provisions of [the securities or commodities laws],
another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is
subject to his supervision.”45 This requirement is deemed met so long
as procedures reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations
have been implemented.46
The Delaware corporate law approach to claims that a board of directors has failed to adequately monitor the corporation’s employees
and activities closely resembles an internal compliance-based approach to liability by holding directors liable for a breach of the duty
of care when a failure to implement internal compliance structures
results in organizational misconduct.47 Although this liability risk
may be slight, it appears that corporate boards—at the urging of le44. See, e.g., United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (suggesting
that “a corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but that the existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation”); In re
the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527990, at *2 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 1995) (upholding jury instructions that “you must consider whether the actions of employees were in
violation of direct . . . policies of the defendant corporations”).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2000).
46. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i). Similar provisions are contained in the Commodity Exchange
Act and in the Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) rules. See, e.g., NASD Conduct Rule
3010, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL (CCH) 4831 (2004) (requiring NASD members to establish and maintain a system to supervise employees); NYSE
RULE 342.21, 2 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE (CHH) ¶ 2342 (2004) (requiring that
trades be subjected to review procedures); Chi. Bd. Options Exch. Rules 4.2, 9.8, CHICAGO
BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE GUIDE (CCH) ¶¶ 2082, 2308 (2004); 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2000).
See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 (2004) (discussing the diffusion of internal controls, particularly in the financial fraud area).
47. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(holding that in order to receive business judgment rule protection, directors must “exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system is in
concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will come to
its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations”).
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gal professionals—may have overestimated the risk of personal liability.48
However, the legal arena that arguably has most ardently embraced the composite and negligence-based organizational liability
approach and, consequently, has had the greatest impact on the
adoption of internal compliance structures is EEO law, especially the
law governing workplace harassment. EEO law incorporates standards of organizational due care into organizational liability determinations in at least three ways.
First, internal compliance structures (especially EEO hiring, promotion, and termination policies; grievance procedures; and diversity
education programs) may operate as a defense against punitive damages in claims of intentional discrimination by allowing organizations to demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO law.49 Although in many cases the defendant’s compliance structures have
been found inadequate to insulate the employer from punitive damages, other defendants have managed to successfully invoke their internal compliance structures as a shield against punitive damages.50
Second, the employer’s EEO-related internal compliance structures may be examined—along with other circumstantial evidence—
to determine whether the employer harbored discriminatory intent.51
In other words, because employers today rarely leave a “smoking
gun” that plaintiffs can invoke to demonstrate overt animus, plaintiffs and defendants alike may rely on circumstantial evidence, in48. Because “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight”
such as “an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists” leads to director liability, the risk of personal liability to directors is probably
slight. Id. at 971. Corporate boards, however, seem to treat the risk as real. See Donald C.
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 819-20 (2001) (arguing
that boards of directors have overestimated the threat of personal liability under Caremark).
49. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that employers who are
able to demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO law may avoid punitive damages for the discriminatory acts of agents acting within the scope of their employment).
50. See, e.g., Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548-49 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that a hospital could not be liable to African-American employees for punitive damages because the hospital undertook widespread antidiscrimination efforts, including its creation of a hospital-wide antidiscrimination policy and its implementation of
a grievance policy and diversity training program; thus, it could not be vicariously liable
for its managerial employees’ discriminatory decisions); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125
F. Supp. 2d 153, 172 (D. Md. 2000) (finding that the defendant employer had demonstrated
a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII because it had “published, maintained, and distributed sexual harassment, open door, and equal opportunity policies”).
51. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1789-92 (1990) (discussing the use at trial of evidence of internal
compliance structures, especially affirmative action policies, to establish the lack of interest defense in sex discrimination cases).
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cluding the presence or lack of EEO hiring, promotion, and termination policies, diversity training, and the like, in order to demonstrate
or disprove intentional discrimination.
Finally, the employer’s internal compliance structures may be
relevant to a determination of liability in any hostile environment
harassment claim, especially supervisor hostile environment harassment of which the employer was unaware.52 Employers face liability for hostile environment harassment under three different standards. First, for coworker hostile environment harassment, the employer is judged under a negligence standard and is liable for all harassment of which it knew or should have known and negligently
failed to correct. Antiharassment policies, employee training designed to prevent harassment, and formal harassment complaint
procedures may all constitute evidence that the employer was not
negligent in failing to discover the harassment.53 Similarly, these
same EEO-compliance structures may be employed to demonstrate
that, despite the plaintiff employee’s complaints of harassment,
knowledge cannot be imputed to the employer.54
Second, with regard to supervisor hostile environment harassment of which the employer was aware, the employer may be held liable for its own negligence in failing to properly respond to the harassment. The implementation of internal grievance procedures, anti52. Hostile environment harassment occurs when the employer’s behavior is so severe
or pervasive that, although there is no tangible harm, such as job loss or decreased pay,
the behavior nonetheless alters the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title
VII. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). The Supreme Court has
also recognized “tangible employment actions,” which involve “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,” made on
the basis of the employee’s membership in any Title VII protected class. Id. at 761. Because the employer faces strict liability for all tangible employment actions, id. at 762-63,
however, the employer’s internal compliance structures should not be relevant to a finding
of liability in tangible employment actions.
53. See, e.g., Newtown v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (D. Conn. 1999) (stating that an employer must provide an avenue for complaints in order to avoid liability for a
negligent failure to know of existing harassment); Velez v. City of New Jersey, 817 A.2d
409, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that “an employer may be held liable for
sexual harassment under a theory of negligence based upon ‘its failure to have in place
well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies, effective formal and informal complaint structures, training, and/or monitoring mechanisms’” (quoting Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’
Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 463 (N.J. 1993))).
54. See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1298-99 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding that because the employer’s well-publicized harassment policy specified the
proper channels for harassment complaints and the plaintiff did not follow those channels,
knowledge of the plaintiff’s harassment could not be imputed to the defendant employer);
Giuliani v. Stuart Corp., 512 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“When companies institute written policies established to deal intelligently with allegations of sexual harassment, it is more likely that management will be informed of any impropriety occurring
within the company. Companies that fail to institute such policies will naturally find
themselves vulnerable to the likelihood that knowledge will be imputed to them.”).
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harassment policies, and diversity training may all constitute evidence of a proper response to the harassment.55
The cases in which the employer’s harassment policies and procedures will be most relevant, however, are cases of supervisor hostile
environment harassment of which the employer was unaware. In
such cases, the employer is held vicariously liable unless it can establish a two-part affirmative defense: “(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”56
In adopting the two-pronged affirmative defense, the Supreme
Court declined to require antiharassment policies and compliance
procedures as a matter of law and never stated that such policies,
standing alone, are sufficient to insulate employers from liability for
supervisor hostile environment harassment. The Court did, however,
highlight the importance of antiharassment policies and internal
complaint procedures in establishing the first prong of the defense,
stating that
[w]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to

55. See, e.g., Idusuyi v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 00-6324, 2002 WL
220640, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2002) (holding that the employer was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on its affirmative defense because it had a policy prohibiting sexual
harassment, a complaint procedure that the plaintiff failed to use, and a two-hour training
session on sexual harassment); Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244 (4th
Cir. 2000) (“An employer’s adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy is an important
factor in determining whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent any sexually harassing behavior.”); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that if “there is
no evidence that an employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad
faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of such a
policy militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the employer ‘exercised reasonable
care to prevent’ and promptly correct sexual harassment” (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998))); Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d
328, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
racial harassment because it had adopted an “antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure, the Code of Conduct and Open Door Policy”).
56. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (adopting the same
standard). The second prong of the Supreme Court’s test has been criticized at length by
legal commentators and social scientists, who argue that victims of sexual harassment
rarely utilize internal complaint procedures for a variety of reasons that are entirely reasonable. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment—
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 181-85 (2001) (noting that survey data reveals that only two to fifteen percent of sexual harassment victims utilize employers’ internal complaint procedures for reasons that include the following: beliefs that informal
avenues are more effective; fear of blame, retaliation, or not being believed; and concerns
regarding the effectiveness of internal complaint procedures).
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the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in
any case when litigating the first element of the defense.57

Many lower courts, however, seem to have gone much further,
treating EEO-related internal compliance structures as both necessary and sufficient conditions for liability avoidance. For example,
some lower courts have treated antiharassment policies and internal
complaint procedures as, in and of themselves, legally sufficient to
establish the reasonableness of the employer’s attempts to prevent or
correct harassment.58 Similarly, many lower courts have seemed to
treat internal compliance structures as a necessary condition for liability avoidance, ruling that employers without such structures
cannot establish the affirmative defense.59
Although the true extent to which EEO-related internal compliance structures result in systematic differences in the rate and
amount of employer liability is an empirical question that has not
fully been answered, two points are clear.60 First, legal compliance
professionals have cleverly, but predictably, packaged EEO internal
compliance structures into absolute necessities for employers hoping
to avoid huge liabilities.61 Second, there has been an increasing em57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
58. See, e.g., Perry, 184 F.3d at 396 (stating that if “there is no evidence that an employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy
was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of such a policy militates strongly
in favor of a conclusion that the employer ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent’ and
promptly correct sexual harassment” (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807)); Citroner, 208 F.
Supp. 2d at 341 (holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent racial
harassment because it had adopted an antiharassment policy and a complaint procedure);
see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T. JEFFERSON
L. REV. 125, 141 (2002) (discussing the role of harassment training in lower court decisions
after Ellerth and Faragher).
59. See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding, as a matter
of law, that defendant employer “could never show that it had exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior” because “it had no policy specifically
aimed at sexual harassment,” only a nondiscrimination policy).
60. Lauren Edelman provides some evidence on this point in an empirical study conducted shortly after the decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986),
which replaced the existing standard of strict vicarious liability with a duty-based liability
standard. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 440 (1999). At the time of the study, only
116 cases raising the grievance procedure affirmative defense had been decided since Meritor. Id. at 440. Of those 116 cases, ninety-one percent indicated that a well-crafted internal
grievance procedure would insulate the employer from liability, and in thirty-six of those
ninety-one percent of cases, the employer’s grievance procedures did insulate the company
from liability. Id. Furthermore, Edelman found that courts were becoming increasingly
willing to defer to employers’ grievance procedures when assessing liability. Id. at 442. If
true, the percentage of cases in which the employer’s EEO internal compliance structures
provide insulation from liability could be much higher today.
61. See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 33, at 163 (stating that “the liability standards in the
EEO field . . . make compliance program quality the key to reducing certain forms of employer liability”); Ellen McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step
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phasis during litigation on the employer’s internal compliance structures, with plaintiffs’ lawyers and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission seeking to determine how much money the employer has spent on such structures, the content of training sessions,
and the expertise of diversity trainers and human resources personnel.62
IV. DETERRENCE UNDER INTERNAL COMPLIANCE-BASED LIABILITY
REGIMES
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence regarding the role of internal compliance structures in reducing organizational misconduct
provides little reason to approach with enthusiasm the U.S. legal
system’s movement to internal compliance-based organizational liability regimes. Surprisingly little empirical evidence exists regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in deterring
organizational misconduct—a disturbing fact given the legal regime’s
heavy reliance on such structures as a liability determinant. Even
more disturbing, however, is the fact that the evidence that does exist is decidedly mixed, with many of the most recent and methodologically sound studies finding no significant correlation between the
most widely used internal compliance structures and reduced organizational misconduct.
This Part analyzes the empirical evidence regarding three types of
internal compliance structures on which the U.S. legal regime places
special reliance: ethics or conduct codes, the OSG-recommended internal compliance structures, and diversity or harassment training.
As will be shown, there is insufficient empirical evidence to conclude
that any of these mechanisms deter organizational misconduct.
A. Ethics Codes
Despite the pervasiveness of ethics codes in corporate America
and the importance ascribed to them by the U.S. legal regime, little
evidence exists to support the theory that ethics codes modify employee behavior. Although some studies do find a significant relationship between ethics codes and employee conduct, they are plagued
with methodological problems, such as a failure to query respondents
on or identify modified behavior due to ethics codes (as opposed to
merely asking respondents whether they believe that ethics codes are
to Avoid Liability, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B10 (“[E]ngaging in quality training in conjunction with a well-written policy will likely translate into successfully meeting the goodfaith defense of Kolstad.”); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 58, at 139 (quoting training advocates
and attorneys as stating that Ellerth and Faragher require harassment training and that
such training will insulate employers from liability).
62. McLaughlin & Merchasin, supra note 61.
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an important factor affecting behavior), a reliance on hypothetical dilemmas in lab settings (as opposed to observing actual conduct in an
employment setting), and a sole reliance on self-reporting.63
Furthermore, these findings are contradicted by a large number of
studies finding no significant relationship between ethics codes and
employee conduct.64 Typical of these is a recent study in which respondents were unable to provide specific examples of instances in
which employees had altered their behavior due to ethics codes,
overwhelmingly indicated that their employers’ conduct codes had
not altered their conduct, and asserted that they had never referred
to their employers’ conduct codes.65
Of course, ethics codes are only one type of internal compliance
structure and, moreover, are a very superficial one. Perhaps researchers have been unable to document a link between ethics codes
and ethical conduct because supporting compliance structures, such
as those required by the OSG, are necessary to deter organizational
misconduct.
B. The OSG
Unfortunately, very little research has attempted to verify
whether the assumption underlying the OSG (that internal compliance structures such as those recommended in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual reduce the incidence of organizational miscon63. See, e.g., Alan Kitson, Taking the Pulse: Ethics and the British Cooperative Bank,
15 J. BUS. ETHICS 1021 (1996) (interviews with seventeen bank managers); Donald L.
McCabe et al., The Influence of Collegiate and Corporate Codes of Conduct on EthicsRelated Behavior in the Workplace, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 461 (1996) (questionnaire to 328 college graduates); Margaret Anne Pierce & John W. Henry, Computer Ethics: The Role of
Personal, Informal, and Formal Codes, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 425 (1996) (questionnaire responses from 356 data-processing management professionals).
64. See, e.g., Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing Some Determinant Effects of Ethical
Consulting Behavior: The Case of Personal and Professional Values, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 449
(1993) (questionnaire survey of 207 national business consultants); Joseph L. Badaracco,
Jr. & Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics: A View from the Trenches, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter
1995, at 8 (interviews with thirty middle managers); Arthur P. Brief et al., What’s Wrong
with the Treadway Commission Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal
Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 183
(1996) (questionnaires and experiment with nearly 400 executives and controllers); Victor
J. Callan, Predicting Ethical Values and Training Needs in Ethics, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 761
(1992) (questionnaires from 226 state government employees); Margaret Anne Cleek &
Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Behavior?, 17 J. BUS.
ETHICS 619 (1998) (questionnaires from 150 graduate and undergraduate business students). However, many of these studies suffer from the same methodological problems that
beset those studies finding a significant relationship between ethics codes and employee
conduct.
65. M. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between Corporate Codes of Ethics
and Behaviour, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 247, 253 (2001) (concluding that although ethics codes
may have the potential to alter employee behavior, “this appears to take place on very rare
occasions”).
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duct) withstands empirical testing. In fact, only three large-scale
studies seek systematically to test the assumptions of the OSG recommendations.66 None of the studies supported the hypothesis that
the OSG-recommended internal compliance structures deter illegal
conduct.
Indeed, two of the studies found unanticipated positive correlations between internal compliance structures and legal violations.
The study authors attributed these findings to the possibility that internal compliance structures, such as those recommended by the
OSG, may serve primarily a window-dressing function designed only
to reduce legal liability.67
C. Diversity and Harassment Training
Finally, due to Supreme Court and lower court interpretations of
EEO law, diversity training (including harassment training) has become an increasingly common type of internal compliance structure.
A 1998 study by the Society for Human Resource Management, for
example, found that seventy-five percent of Fortune 500 firms and
thirty-six percent of other firms have a diversity training program of
some sort.68
Nonetheless, there is little empirical support for the proposition
that diversity training reduces discriminatory conduct. In a recent
working paper, Katerina Bezrukova and Karen Jehn of the Wharton
School reviewed twenty empirical studies published in major management, psychological, and sociological journals and concluded that
“[h]aving reviewed the available empirical studies on the effects of
66. See M. Cash Mathews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and Misbehavior,
in 9 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 107, 108-09, 125 (William
C. Frederick & Lee E. Preston eds., 1987) (examining the incidence of civil and administrative actions taken by four federal regulatory agencies against 485 corporations from 1973
through 1980 and concluding that “there is little relationship between codes of conduct
[and their enforcement mechanisms] and corporate violations”); McKendall et al., supra
note 30 (implementing a longitudinal study finding that the presence of OSGrecommended compliance structures do not reduce the incidence of OSHA violations);
Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Illegality, 8 ORG. SCI. 624 (1997).
67. Mathews, supra note 66, at 125-26 (finding a positive correlation between certain
aspects of conduct code content—such as codes that require compliance affidavits by employees or that mention “maintaining the reputation of the corporation”—and the number
of legal violations and concluding that “[p]erhaps executives in law-abiding corporations do
not feel the need to convince others of their ‘good reputation’”); McKendall et al., supra
note 30, at 380 (finding a positive correlation between the OSG-recommended internal
compliance structures and the incidence of willful and repeat OSHA violations and concluding that, because willful and repeat violations are the type most likely to include senior management involvement or knowledge, organizations may be using the OSGrecommended internal compliance structures to hide management involvement in, or reduce organizational liability for, purposeful illegal activity).
68. Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organizational Development Approach to Creating Diversity, 30 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 149, 149 (2001).
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diversity training programs in corporations and on campuses it is obvious that it is too soon to draw any comprehensive conclusions.”69
Although much of the empirical research reviewed by Professors
Bezrukova and Jehn identified improvements in diversity training
participants’ awareness of diversity issues,70 only one of the studies
documented sustained attitudinal or behavioral changes.71
Similarly, in the most comprehensive study of diversity training
and other EEO compliance measures ever undertaken, Alexandra
Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelley combine survey information
on affirmative action and diversity programs from more than 800
American employers with annual federal data on their workforce
composition from 1971 to 1999.72 As a general rule, organizations

69. Katerina Bezrukova & Karen A. Jehn, The Effects of Diversity Training Programs
16 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
70. Id. at 10-11; see also Heidi Tarr Henson, Gauging the Outcomes of Organizational
Diversity Implementations: The Intersection of Attitudes, Awareness and Behavior, 60
DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2325 (2000) (finding that diversity training achieved an
awareness of diversity issues but did not result in attitudinal changes); Dick Wallace
Kracht, Diversity Training Among Manufacturing Companies: Reaction and Learning in a
For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Work Environment, 59 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2345
(1999) (finding an increase in perceived learning among 141 employees after diversity
training); Dana Yavette Law, An Evaluation of a Cultural Diversity Training Program, 59
DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2468 (1998) (finding improved awareness of diversity issues in training group relative to control group); Jean A. Mausehund et al., Diversity
Training: Effects of an Intervention Treatment on Nonverbal Awareness, BUS. COMM. Q.,
Mar. 1995, at 27 (finding a positive link between diversity training and awareness of nonverbal factors in interpersonal communications between people from different cultures);
David L. Tan et al., Changes in Attitude After Diversity Training, TRAINING & DEV., Sept.
1996, at 54 (finding a significant increase in diversity awareness in 739 managers after diversity training workshops).
71. See Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 69, at 11-13. Compare Taylor Cox, Jr., The
Multicultural Organization, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, May 1991, at 34, 45 (finding that
“Race Relations Competence Workshops” resulted in more positive attitudes toward African Americans and better interrace relations among workshop participants), with Sara
Rynes & Benson Rosen, What Makes Diversity Programs Work?, H.R. MAG., Oct. 1994, at
67 (surveying 785 members of the Society for Human Resource Management and finding
positive short-term impact of diversity training on attitudes but less positive long-term
benefits), Diane Marie Govern, The Effect of Diversity Awareness Training on Oral Presentation Ratings, 58 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 5681 (1998) (finding no correlation between diversity training and ratings of oral presentations by black and white police sergeant candidates), and Henson, supra note 70, at 2325 (finding no attitudinal change in
respondents from diversity training). Bezrukova and Jehn reviewed five studies that tested
the impact of diversity training programs on college campuses. Bezrukova & Jehn, supra
note 69, at 12. Three of the studies found a small positive correlation between diversity
training and attitudes toward ethnic minorities. However, the authors attributed this
variation to self-selection bias, rather than to a real change in attitudes. Id. at 12-13.
Further compromising the effectiveness of diversity training are two factors: first, the
backlash that may result; and, second, the attempt to “sterilize” diversity training sessions
in anticipation of the fact that statements made may be admitted as evidence during litigation. Krawiec, supra note 21, at 515 nn.96-97 (discussing the evidence on backlash and
sterilization of training sessions).
72. Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Two to Tango: Affirmative Action, Diversity Programs and Women and African-Americans in Management 2 (unpublished draft), avail-
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that implemented diversity training programs aimed at individuals
did not significantly improve managerial diversity and, in fact,
tended to significantly decrease the odds of women in management
positions.73 Although the authors did find that some affirmative action and diversity measures (especially those programs designed to
“couple” rhetoric regarding diversity goals with activities designed to
promote diversity) had significant, positive impacts on the odds of
women and minorities in management, particularly at employers
that are government contractors, they conclude that diversity measures designed to counter managerial bias, including diversity training, are least effective.74
In the end, Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly conclude that at least some
types of EEO internal compliance structures can enhance diversity, if
coupled with legal accountability.75 Their study demonstrates, however, how much we have yet to learn about the impacts of EEO compliance structures on different demographic groups and the circumstances under which even the most promising EEO compliance structures can be expected to combat discrimination. In the rapid move to
internal compliance-based organizational liability, however, such distinctions appear to have been uniformly ignored.
As extensively discussed by Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of sexual harassment
training is equally sparse.76 As noted by two researchers in the field,
able at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dobbin/cv/unpublished/2004_aapractices_kalev.pdf (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005).
73. Id. at 28. With respect to all employers, diversity training had a significant, negative impact on the odds of black women in management positions and no significant impact
on the odds of white women and black men in management positions. Id. at 53 tbl.2. However, when the data are broken down into the impact of diversity training at government
contractors (who are subject to affirmative action obligations) versus noncontractors, diversity training among the latter is shown to have a significant, negative impact on the
odds of both white and black women in management positions, while failing to significantly
impact the odds of black men. Id. at 54 tbl.3. In contrast, among employers that are government contractors, diversity training had a significant, positive impact on the odds of
white women in management positions, while failing to impact the odds of black men or
black women. Id.
74. Id. at 28-29, 31, 37. Many diversity measures impacted different demographic
groups differently. For example, a program or measure might improve the odds of white
women in management while at the same time negatively impacting or failing to significantly impact the odds of black men in management. Id. at 53 tbl.2, 54 tbl.3. However, as a
general rule, measures designed to combat the “decoupling” of diversity rhetoric from action (such as affirmative action plans, diversity committees, and diversity staff positions)
enhanced managerial diversity more than other measures did. Id. at 28. In addition, the effectiveness of different measures varied across type of employer: diversity measures tended
to be more effective at government contractors, who are subject to affirmative action obligations, than at noncontractors. Id. at 30-32.
75. Id. at 38.
76. Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 31-38 (2001) [hereinafter Bi-
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“[T]he unpleasant empirical truth is that almost nothing is known
about the effects of sexual harassment education and training programs.”77 Given the dearth of research on the effects of sexual harassment training, many social scientists are alarmed at the unwavering commitment of employers and compliance professionals to harassment training.78
Moreover, the existing research on the effects of harassment
training fails to support the hypothesis that harassment training alters employee conduct. Although some studies do support the notion
that harassment training increases trainees’ awareness of potential
instances of harassment, many researchers doubt that the training
has long-term effects on attitudes or behavior.79
D. Summary
In sum, the data regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance-based organizational liability regimes is both preliminary and
disturbing. First, the fact that the U.S. legal regime has so quickly
transitioned to internal compliance-based liability regimes based on
such limited and conflicting evidence is troubling. Existing studies
are insufficient in number, methodology, and scope to warrant such a
move. Nonetheless, this trend should not be surprising, given the political influence of those who benefit most from an internal compliance-based liability regime—organizational defendants and the legal
compliance professionals who serve them.
Perhaps more importantly, the evidence that does exist regarding
the effectiveness of internal compliance-based liability regimes suggests that many types of widely used internal compliance structures
currently considered to demonstrate good-faith organizational attempts to comply with the law are ineffective at reducing organizational misconduct. Even the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study, which
concludes that EEO internal compliance structures can enhance
EEO compliance under some circumstances,80 demonstrates the dangers of an ill-conceived internal compliance-based liability regime. If
that regime rewards organizations even for those compliance measures that decouple compliance rhetoric from compliance activity or
som-Rapp, Ounce] (reviewing some existing studies); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing
the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 967-76 (1999) (arguing that many employers adopt minimally disruptive symbolic compliance policies and procedures that result in little, if any, substantive
change in the employment environment); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 58, at 142-44.
77. Robert S. Moyer & Anjan Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on
Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 334 (1998).
78. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 58, at 142-43 (pointing out two reasons why it may be
dangerous to implement such training without sufficient information).
79. Id. at 143-44.
80. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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that have been shown to be of limited effectiveness, then such a regime may fail to accomplish—and may even thwart—the goal of reducing organizational misconduct.81
In short, given the theoretical problems inherent in internal compliance-based liability regimes discussed in Part II of this Article and
the large and politically powerful interest groups that stand to benefit from such a regime, defenders of the move to internal compliancebased organizational liability systems should bear the burden of
proving the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in reducing organizational misconduct. The analysis of the available empirical evidence detailed in this Part indicates that this burden has not
been met.
V. EXPLAINING THE ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME
Why does the law place so much reliance on factors, such as internal compliance structures, that appear to have little impact on the
incidence of organizational misconduct? This Part explores two possible explanations: (1) an overreliance on principal-agent models of
organizational misconduct and (2) public-choice explanations.
A. Principal-Agent Models of Misconduct
One potential explanation for the legal regime’s heavy reliance on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant is an overreliance on principal-agent models of organizational misconduct.82 In other
words, current legal theory largely assumes that misconduct within organizations results from the acts of single, independent agents who disregard the preferences of shareholder principals and their representatives—the board of directors and senior management.83 In the more so-

81. The Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study also demonstrates that even when internal
compliance structures provide some positive results, they may be accompanied by unintended negative consequences. For example, some diversity measures appeared to benefit
one demographic group at the expense of another, although both groups were the ostensible beneficiaries of the measures. See Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 72, at 33, 53 tbl.2,
54 tbl.3 (finding that some diversity measures increase the odds of management positions
for one minority demographic group, while decreasing it for one or more other minority
demographic groups).
82. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 834 (“These agents are rational self-interested
utility maximizers who commit crimes in order to benefit themselves. In pursuit of his own
self-interest an agent may commit a crime that incidentally benefits the corporation, but
this is not its purpose.”); Kevin B. Huff, The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252,
1288-89 (1996); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response
to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 19 n.82 (2002) (criticizing the
view of organizational misconduct as the behavior of a single, errant agent).
83. In the majority of large organizations in which organizational misconduct is detected, active participation in or direct knowledge of the misconduct is rarely attributable
to senior management and even more rarely to the board of directors.
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phisticated version of this argument, even when misconduct is undertaken in order to enhance corporate profitability or performance, the
primary motivation is to promote or safeguard the careers of the agents
undertaking the misconduct.84
If the law overrelies on principal-agent models of organizational
misconduct, then one can see why the legal system might place too
much emphasis on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant. If organizational misconduct is simply an agency cost
problem, then internal compliance structures—such as internal
monitoring and reporting, employee training, and conduct codes—
might reduce such problems by increasing the ease with which
shareholder principals (through senior management and boards of
directors) can monitor employee and mid-level management agents.85
Unfortunately, however, organizational misconduct is much more
complicated than this. The simple principal-agent model of organizational misconduct embodied in much legal theory conflates the concepts of what sociologists refer to as organizational misconduct—
conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the organization—and
occupational misconduct—conduct undertaken solely to benefit the
perpetrator and from which the organization derives no benefit.86 Indeed, the organization may actually be the victim of occupational
misconduct, as in the case of embezzlement, for example.
Because the agent derives no direct benefit from organizational
misconduct, the personal benefits from such actions must derive from
increased pay, status, or job security—benefits resulting from the
appearance of organizational profitability caused by the misconduct.87 Unless organizational agents systematically miscalculate the
probability that organizational misconduct will positively impact the
bottom line, then, by definition, their conduct must create real or apparent profits. Real profits in excess of real costs will, of course, always benefit shareholder principals. In addition, the creation of apparent profits will sometimes benefit shareholder principals. Therefore, as discussed below, the category of actions that represent
84. Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations,
71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 319 (1991).
85. By focusing on the costs and benefits of organizational misconduct to shareholders, I do not mean to imply that other organizational stakeholders are unaffected by such
actions. Indeed, as demonstrated by recent events at Enron and Arthur Andersen, often
low-level employees, creditors, and other stakeholders far removed from the misconduct in
question are greatly harmed by organizational misconduct.
86. See supra note 1 for sources defining organizational misconduct.
87. See Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Key to Risk Management: Management, in RISK
MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY 103 (Michael Frenkel et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that the academic finance and management literature has failed to develop a sufficient understanding of organizational misbehavior because it is overly focused on agency
cost explanations when, in many of the most high-profile misconduct examples, the agent’s
incentives were aligned with those of his or her firm, at least in the beginning).
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attempts to increase shareholder-principal welfare may be larger
than is typically assumed. These actions thus are not properly characterized as principal-agent problems.
Specifically, a simple agency cost model of organizational misconduct is incomplete in at least two ways. First, a model of organizational misconduct that treats agent misdeeds as the feat of a lone individual actor ignores the role played by the organizational system in
shaping that conduct. Second, organizational misconduct may benefit
organizational profitability and performance (and thus shareholder
welfare) in subtle and difficult-to-quantify ways, which means that
organizational management (even when acting as the loyal agents of
shareholder owners) may have reasons to tolerate such behavior that
are not immediately obvious.
1. Organizational Environment
For many years now, researchers who study human behavior have
been aware of the powerful role played by environment, including organizational environment, in shaping individual perceptions and actions. Yet many legal scholars, and the legal system itself, steadfastly ignore any responsibility by those who create that climate for
the acts of errant agents, except to the extent that other organizational actors were actually aware of or contributed to the misconduct.
Yet, senior management, through the organizational climate that
it creates, plays an important role in shaping agent conduct. Although senior management shapes the organizational environment
(and thus employee conduct) in many ways, at least three mechanisms have been extensively studied: organizational culture, incentive and reward systems, and management’s commitment to ethical
conduct.88 For example, a climate in which employees are encouraged
to pursue or are rewarded for pursuing the bottom line even at the
expense of breaking laws or the company’s conduct code is more
likely to produce agents who violate laws and conduct codes.89 Simi-

88. Other individual (that is, personal values), organizational (for example, organization size, decentralization, and financial distress), and industry (for example, concentration) factors have also been shown to impact organizational misconduct rates. See, e.g.,
McKendall & Wagner, supra note 66, at 644 (finding that organizational size, structure,
complexity, and industry concentration are significant factors impacting the incidence of
corporate illegality); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 368, 376 (discussing earlier studies
that proposed that illegal activity is more likely in firms facing financial pressure and finding that lower firm profitability is positively associated with firm OSHA violations).
89. See, e.g., Allen & Davis, supra note 64, at 456 (finding that corporate culture and
reward systems—rather than mere ethics codes—impact employee behavior); Anita Jose &
Mary S. Thibodeaux, Institutionalization of Ethics: The Perspective of Managers, 22 J. BUS.
ETHICS 133, 138 (1999) (finding that 98.8% of managers surveyed ranked top management
support and that 93% ranked corporate culture as more important than other factors such
as conduct codes and training programs in encouraging ethical corporate conduct).

600

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:571

larly, lower-level employees are likely to take their cues regarding
what behavior is acceptable from senior management and coworkers.
Agents who believe that management’s commitment to the observance of laws and organizational rules is symbolic rather than real
are more likely to disregard those laws and rules.90
Finally, the compensation and reward system employed by management may greatly affect employee behavior. Rewards and punishments that are performance-based and fail to properly account for
the method by which performance goals are attained are likely to result in more violations than a reward and punishment system that
more carefully accounts for the means by which performance goals
are attained.91
I am not asserting that, as a general rule, organizational liability
regimes should attempt to account for factors related to the incidence
of organizational misconduct—such as organizational culture, incentive and reward systems, and management’s commitment to ethical
actions—by directly incorporating them into liability, sanctioning, or
prosecutorial determinations.92 Like determinations regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance structures, an analysis of these
factors by legal decisionmakers is likely to be difficult, costly, and
fraught with errors.93 Nor am I attempting to exonerate culpable in-

90. See supra note 12 for sources discussing the importance of managerial attitudes
and behavior in deterring organizational misconduct.
91. Allen & Davis, supra note 64, at 456 (finding that organizational reward systems
significantly impact employee behavior); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the
Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 34-40 (2003) (discussing organizational
reward and compensation systems).
92. Lawmakers have on several occasions demonstrated an awareness that factors
such as organizational culture and reward systems may contribute to organizational misconduct. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON
THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 54 (2003) [hereinafter AD HOC REPORT]
(urging organizations to “promote an organizational culture that encourages a commitment to
compliance with the law”), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AG_Final.pdf
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005); News Release, SEC, SEC Chairman Levitt Receives Compensation Committee’s Report Highlighting Industry ‘Best Practices’; Calls on Entire Industry to
Review Closely (Apr. 10, 1995) (warning that the compensation system used by many broker-dealers provides incentives to churn customer accounts and recommend unsuitable investments), available at 1995 WL 154267.
93. There are likely to be some instances where the connection between organizational incentive systems and organizational misconduct is quite clear. One commonly cited
example is the complaint brought against Sears, Roebuck & Company by consumers and
attorneys general in more than forty states. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 107. In an attempt to revive
lagging sales in its automotive service centers, Sears management imposed minimum work
quotas, productivity incentives, product-specific sales quotas, paid its automotive service
salesmen and mechanics with commissions based on sales, and exerted considerable pressure on automotive center employees to perform more work. Id. Predictably, many employees responded by defrauding customers through sales of unnecessary parts and services.
Id. at 108. Sears eventually settled the suits for sixty million dollars. Id.
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dividual actors by suggesting that a focus on the environment that
contributed to their misconduct is warranted. Instead, my goal is
simply to demonstrate the extraordinary amount of influence that
the organization (through senior management) has on the level of
misconduct in its ranks—an influence that is obscured by perceptions
of organizational misconduct as an agency cost problem stemming
from the acts of individual deviant agents.
2. Misconduct and Organizational Performance
In addition, many legal scholars assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that many forms of agent misconduct provide no potential
benefits to the organization itself. My goal in this Part, however, is to
provide several examples of conduct typically thought to provide no
organizational benefits and to demonstrate the circumstances under
which this assumption may be false. I do not offer conclusive proof
that such misconduct positively impacts the bottom line; the research
in this area is too preliminary to warrant such a conclusion. Instead,
my goal is simply to induce greater skepticism toward the claim that
these actions necessarily reflect the isolated misconduct of a single or
small group of deviant agents who have succeeded—despite management’s best efforts—to violate laws or company policies.
Some incidents of agent misconduct provide such obvious potential benefits for the firm that the inevitable organizational disavowals of such conduct as the acts of a deviant or “rogue” employee
should be viewed with immediate skepticism.94 The most recent
variation on this scenario has arisen in connection with the recent
mutual fund scandal. For example, in early November 2003, state
and federal authorities charged seven former Prudential employees
with securities fraud in connection with mutual fund market-timing
trades on behalf of large hedge fund clients but did not charge Prudential or its senior management team. The brokers claimed, however, that both management and the firm’s compliance department
were fully aware of the trades and rewarded the brokers handsomely
for the fees they brought in.95
94. Paine, supra note 93, at 106 (noting that business “executives are quick to describe any wrongdoing as an isolated incident, the work of a rogue employee,” but that
“unethical business practice involves the tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of others and reflects the values, attitudes, beliefs, language, and behavioral patterns that define an organization’s operating culture”).
95. David Barboza, Brokers Say Prudential Approved Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2003, at C1. According to the Massachusetts Securities Division, charges may be brought
against Prudential if it appears that high-level executives knew about or sanctioned the illicit trades. Id. As previously stated, however, such direct knowledge of or participation in
organizational misconduct by senior management is extremely rare. Instead, the far more
typical situation occurs when management creates an environment in which such conduct
is encouraged and rewarded. Often, the most that can be concluded is that management
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Other forms of organizational misconduct, however, may provide
less obvious organizational benefits. This Part discusses three examples of agent misconduct that, at first blush, seem to provide no potential benefits for shareholder principals: “rogue” trading, discrimination, and financial fraud.
(a) Rogue Trading
“Rogue,” or unauthorized, trading may appear to be a classic example of occupational—as opposed to organizational—misconduct
that causes only harm to the corporate enterprise, as evidenced by
the many large and highly publicized rogue trading losses throughout the years. This perception of rogue-trading as isolated incidences
of occupational misconduct is reinforced by the presence of extensive
written conduct codes and costly compliance programs apparently
designed to deter unauthorized trading. However, the same environment that gives rise to rogue trading may also foster other
traits—for example, greed, independence, and risk-taking—that result in more profitable traders.96 As a result, shareholder principals
may be willing to tolerate some rogue-trading losses, so long as they
are offset by the benefits of a more profitable trading floor.
First, traders tend to have a heightened sense of materialism, because the trading floor climate is designed to foster such an attitude.97 Rather than rewarding successful traders with impressive titles or moves up the career ladder, the trading floor hierarchy tends
to consist only of traders who earn more money for the firm and receive higher bonuses, versus traders who earn less.98

set up a system that allowed or encouraged the misconduct to take place, then took steps to
remain willfully ignorant of the behavior. See, e.g., id. (discussing vacations, bonuses, and
management praise bestowed on the indicted brokers due to the large commissions earned
on their hedge fund accounts).
96. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader
Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301, 316 (2000) (arguing that some financial institutions have
made a conscious decision to foster an organizational climate that gives rise to at least
some rogue trading, because to do so may maximize trading floor profits, and thus management compensation and status). The problem is likely exacerbated by a variety of behavioral factors, including the tendency to trust those whom we have trusted in the past.
Because the events that give rise to large rogue-trading losses involve serial decisionmaking and substantial sunk costs, supervisors and others within the firm may tend toward an
irrational escalation of commitment. Id.
97. MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL
STREET 18, 30 (1996). “Money is more than just the medium of exchange; it is a measure of
one’s ‘winnings.’ It provides an identity that prevails over charisma, physical attractiveness, or sociability as the arbiter of success and power on the bond trading floor. The topearning trader is king of the mountain.” Id. at 30.
98. Krawiec, supra note 96, at 329.
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Second, only individuals comfortable with taking large risks are
attracted to, and survive in, trading floor jobs.99 The compensation
structure at most trading institutions, which is based almost exclusively on trading profits earned in the current fiscal year, exacerbates this attitude by sending a message that short-term profitability
will be rewarded even if incurred at the cost of taking greater
risks.100 The high number of largely unsuccessful attempts by financial institutions to revise traders’ compensation packages indicates
that managers of financial institutions are aware of the potentially
perverse incentives being created but have yet to find a mechanism
for eradicating them that is compatible with encouraging the most
profitable trading strategies.101
Finally, traders tend to be self-reliant and entrepreneurial, operating in an independent and often uncooperative environment. As a
result, traders may view their primary obligation as maximizing the
value of their own account and, thus, feel little duty to supervise
those around them for potential violations of trading rules.102
Although these traits may contribute to rogue traders who violate
the firm’s risk and loss limits, firms may tolerate—and even encourage—those traits because such tolerance also may create more prof99. The impact of organizational environment and selection processes on individual
risk-taking attitudes and behavior has been a subject of study for many researchers. See,
e.g., James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33
MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987). March and Shapira explain that
[a]lthough [managers] undoubtedly vary in their individual propensities to take
risks, those variations are obscured by processes of selection that reduce the
heterogeneity among managers and encourage them to believe in their ability
to control the odds, by systems of organizational controls and incentives that
dictate risk taking behavior in significant ways, and by variations in the demand for risk taking produced by the context within which choice takes place.
Id. at 1414.
100. Krawiec, supra note 96, at 330; When Words Are Not Bonds: Wall Street Pay,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 1994, at 90 (stating that Wall Street “bonuses account for at least
75% of total remuneration”).
101. For example, after its own rogue-trading scandal in 1994, Salomon Brothers attempted to revise its compensation system by providing investment bankers, traders, and
other employees with as much as half their pay in Salomon Brothers stock at a fifteen percent discount, which could not be sold for five years. Michael Siconolfi, Salomon Looks at
Backing Out of Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1995, at C1. After the announcement,
Salomon lost twenty of its two hundred managing directors, including several top traders.
Id. The plan was discontinued. Id.; see also Pay Dirt: Salomon Brothers, ECONOMIST, July
1, 1995, at 67. Attempts at such revisions by other financial institutions have met with a
similar fate. See Bonus Points, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 71 (discussing efforts at various financial services firms to restructure their compensation systems in an effort to reduce agency costs and unauthorized activities).
102. See ABOLAFIA, supra note 97, at 28-29; Gordon L. Clark, Rogues and Regulation in
Global Finance: Maxwell, Leeson and the City of London, 31 REGIONAL STUD. 221, 226
(“The firm deliberately sets-off their traders one against the other, and from the firm’s own
resources so that each trader’s performance can be directly compared; group-based or
team-based organizational modes of trading are eschewed at this level of the firm in favour
of a model which can identify and reward the best and the brightest.”).
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itable traders. For example, a recent comparison of U.S. and Japanese trading floors shows that U.S. trading firms tend to follow a
“market control” pattern in which traders are given high authority,
few risk or loss limits, and high incentive compensation.103 Japanese
trading firms, by contrast, tend to follow a “bureaucratic control” pattern under which traders have little discretion, strict risk and loss
limits, low incentive compensation, and a high level of organizational
control.104 The study found that the market-control firms were significantly more profitable than their bureaucratic-control counterparts and were willing to tolerate higher levels of “acceptable risk.”105
In other words, traders at market-control style firms had shared values regarding the acceptability of higher risk levels within the
firm.106
(b) Discrimination
The notion that organizational diversity is “good for business” has
become a common mantra both among organizational leaders and in
the management literature.107 Accordingly, discrimination may appear at first blush a simple matter of individual employee deviance
that cannot properly be characterized as organizational misconduct.108 Unfortunately for those with hopes for a more diverse and in103. Srilata Zaheer, Acceptable Risk: A Study of Global Currency Trading Rooms in the
US and Japan, in PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: EFFICIENCY, INNOVATION,
REGULATION 462, 472, 489-91 (Patrick T. Harker & Stavros A. Zenios eds., 2000).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 490.
106. Id. at 489-90. Interestingly, the market-control firms did not have significantly
higher levels of actual risk. Id. at 490. This may not tell us much about the propensity for
rogue trading, however. By definition, traders attempt to hide unauthorized trades from
the formal control system, meaning that it may not have shown up in the study. Because
the Zaheer study was not designed to and did not measure the incidence of trading violations within the firm, it cannot be used as evidence regarding the comparative levels of actual rogue trading within the two types of firms. However, the findings on profitability and
acceptable risk levels are supportive of the notion that market-control-style firms may
have a propensity for both higher profitability and higher levels of trading violations.
107. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (“[M]ajor American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints.” (citing to amici curiae briefs of 3M Corp. and General Motors Corp.)); Robin J.
Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity Perspectives
on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229, 229 (2001) (discussing advice in management literature that diversity enhances workgroup performance); David B.
Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The
Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1571-91 (2004) (discussing the widespread attachment to the belief
that diversity enhances corporate profitability and competitiveness).
108. This attitude is reflected in the early caselaw involving workplace discrimination.
See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“The issue before the Court is whether Title VII was intended to hold an employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of one employee to another.” (footnote omitted)); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stat-
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tegrated American workforce, the empirical research indicates that
the effect of diversity on organizational performance is complicated
and uncertain and that diversity provides both benefits and costs depending on context, time frame, and the type of diversity in question.109
For example, researchers have studied the effects of two types of
diversity—diversity with respect to “underlying attributes” and diversity with respect to “observable attributes”—on several different
measures of workgroup performance, including outcomes, processes,
and individual perceptions and satisfaction.110 Diversity on underlying attributes—such as education, technical abilities, tenure in the
organization, socioeconomic background, personality characteristics,
or personal values—has been found in some studies to positively impact outcomes by expanding the set of possibilities considered and
discussed, leading to more creative solutions to organizational problems.111 At the same time, however, some studies have found that diversity on underlying attributes negatively affects workgroup processes by imposing costs, such as increased turnover and more formal,
less frequent communication among workgroup members.112 Some
studies have found these process losses to be offset, however, by increased contact with members outside of the workgroup, resulting in
a broader range of ideas considered by the workgroup.113
In contrast, the results of research on the impact of observable attributes such as race, ethnicity, age, and gender provide grounds for
more pessimism about the effects of diversity on workgroup performance. For example, demographically heterogeneous groups have performed both better and worse than demographically homogenous
groups in terms of workgroup outcomes, sometimes considering a
greater number and diversity of alternatives in a decisionmaking

ing that a supervisor’s harassing conduct appeared to be “nothing more than a personal
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism”).
109. Ely & Thomas, supra note 107, at 229; Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins,
Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 402, 405-12 (1996) (summarizing the research on
the impact of workgroup diversity on performance); Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A.
O’Reilly, III, Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, in 20 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 77 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1998) (reviewing over eighty studies by psychologists, economists, sociologists,
anthropologists, communication and education researchers, and organizational scholars).
110. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109, at 93114.
111. See Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 409-12 (summarizing the literature).
Researchers consider it important, however, that the majority of studies finding positive
outcome effects of diversity are laboratory studies rather than field studies. See Williams &
O’Reilly, supra note 109, at 79.
112. Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109, at 94-96.
113. Id. at 94-98.
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task and sometimes not.114 Furthermore, some studies have shown
that, to the extent any creativity benefits do emerge from demographically heterogeneous groups, such benefits are likely to emerge
only after the group has been together for some time.115
In addition, any positive impact on the outcome variable may be
overshadowed by the negative impacts of demographic diversity on
the process variable. In other words, to the extent that any outcome
benefits may emerge from workgroup heterogeneity, they may be
outweighed by the higher transaction costs of managing a demographically diverse workforce. As a general rule, more demographically diverse workgroups experience higher turnover rates, greater
absenteeism of the dissimilar group members, lower levels of integration and communication, and lower levels of satisfaction and identification with the group. In addition, individuals who are dissimilar
from their supervisors on demographic variables tend to receive
lower performance evaluations.116 As noted by Frances Milliken and
Luis Martins, “[t]he consistency of these findings suggests . . . that
groups and organizations will act systematically to drive out individuals who are different from the majority, unless this tendency to
drive out diversity is managed.”117
In a recent paper, Professor Donald Langevoort provides a different theory that, if true, also predicts a lack of organizational incentives for the creation of a diverse workforce. Langevoort cogently argues that the mechanisms by which middle managers are hired,
tested, and promoted within many firms reward the presence of psychological traits—including overconfidence, risk taking, and
“grease”—that are more commonly found in white males than in
other demographic groups.118 If this is true, then corporate America’s
mechanisms for selecting top managers may result in more profitable
companies that exclude women and minorities from their upper
ranks and impose other negative externalities on society through the
choice of business decisions that they make.

114. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, 405-409; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109,
at 102-14.
115. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 407; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109,
at 112.
116. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 405-08; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note
109, at 103, 106, 113.
117. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 420; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1788 (2003)
(book review) (arguing that “greater employee homogeneity decreases the transaction costs
of managing a [diverse] workforce”).
118. Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and Discrimination from a Corporate Perspective:
Grease, Grit and the Personality Types of Tournament Survivors, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 15-16, 19-20, on file with author).
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According to Langevoort, many companies organize middle managers into work teams that must solve some set of problems and then
negotiate with non-team members within the firm the perception of
how the team has performed.119 Typically, middle managers are rotated through different workgroups and evaluated on both a team
and individual basis.120 Accordingly, rising to the top of the management pool requires iterated success—more likely if the individual is
confident and willing to take risks121—and necessitates a psychological makeup referred to by researchers as “High Machiavellianism,”
or “high-Mach.”122
Both self-confidence and the tendency to take risks are believed to
vary across gender, racial, and ethnic lines.123 Langevoort argues that
the third trait required for managerial success—grease—is also more
likely to be present in the dominant demographic group. He hypothesizes that “greasy” people—those high-Mach individuals who are able
to effortlessly make strong in-group connections when required and
yet defect when it is in their self-interest—are likely to succeed in the
managerial tournament.124 By contrast, “gritty” people—those who
are unable to perform this routine successfully—will not.125 If the
process of serially forming, and then dropping, strong in-group connections is facilitated by homogeneity, the mere fact of being different from the dominant majority may insert grit into the process. In
other words, members of racial, gender, or cultural minority groups
may be grittier simply by virtue of being different, unless they are

119. Id. (manuscript at 12).
120. Id.
121. Id. (manuscript at 15-16). Self-confidence is positively associated with the ability
to persuade others, greater persistence, and a willingness to take risks. Id. (manuscript at
15); SIMON GERVAIS ET AL., THE POSITIVE ROLE OF OVERCONFIDENCE AND OPTIMISM IN
INVESTMENT POLICY (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 15-02,
2002), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~rlwctr/papers/0215.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 27-29 (1993) (arguing that optimistic
bias in organizational judgments leads to risk taking). In any large organization where getting ahead is based on iterated success of the nature described here, some percentage of
“lucky risk-takers” are likely to distinguish themselves both from the unlucky risk-takers
(who presumably fall out of the tournament early) and those who play it safe (thereby lasting in the tournament up to some point, but ultimately underperforming the lucky risktakers). Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 15).
122. Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 18). High-Mach individuals possess
the ability to cooperate and display intense in-group loyalty when necessary, while behaving in an aggressively competitive manner to out-group members. Id. (manuscript at 1718). Importantly, high-Mach individuals are able to seamlessly defect and switch to a new
in-group when self-advancement so dictates. Id. (manuscript at 18); see also Samuel
Bowles et al., The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1137, 1161-62 (2001).
123. Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 16).
124. Id. (manuscript at 19).
125. Id.
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willing and able to successfully mimic the behavior of white males.126
Langevoort argues that, although this may be efficient within the
firm structure, “senior executive suites . . . overpopulated by highMach risk-takers, filled with hubris, adept at self-deception, and
empty of strong ethical grounding” may create troubling negative externalities associated with the kind of business decisions they
make.127
Similarly, the exclusion of certain demographic out-groups from
the organization has historically been used by some corporations to
inculcate employee loyalty and pride or to increase employee productivity. For example, southern textile mills once explicitly refused to
hire African Americans in order to create a sense of privilege in their
white workers.128 This sense of privilege was then employed to justify
the mills’ low wages and unsafe working conditions.129
In addition, Ford Motor Company purposely excluded women from
assembly line work during the early twentieth century. In so doing,
the company was able to create an image of assembly-line work as
masculine, calling into question the manhood of employees who could
not meet target production levels and paying those who could a wage
that, in the words of one Ford manager at the time, would help them
“to be better men.”130 Although changed social mores and the advent
of antidiscrimination laws have presumably induced organizations to
abandon such practices as a conscious or explicit mechanism for incentivizing labor, the research on workgroup homogeneity discussed
above suggests that organizations may still derive benefits from the
exclusion of demographic out-group members.
I do not mean to suggest that organizations are free to create a
completely homogenous workforce or that senior management consciously or intentionally excludes on the basis of race or gender simply to improve cooperation and loyalty among employees. Both legal
and societal constraints militate against such behavior. In addition, I
do not claim to have offered any “proof” that discriminatory behavior
positively affects firm profits. As already noted, the state of research
in this field is not sufficiently developed to support such a conclusion.
126. Id. (manuscript at 20); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Naomi Ellemers et al., Sticking Together or Falling
Apart: In-Group Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus Individual Mobility, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1997).
127. Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 22-23).
128. DAVID L. CARLTON, MILL AND TOWN IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1880-1920 (1982);
NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX ET AL., BEYOND MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: TOWARD A NEW
SYNTHESIS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9029, 2002).
129. LAMOREAUX ET AL., supra note 128, at 28.
130. Id. at 28-29; Wayne A. Lewchuk, Men and Monotony: Fraternalism as a Managerial Strategy at the Ford Motor Company, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 824, 843 (1993).
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Instead, my goal is simply to call into question the automatic assumption that behaviors such as those discussed in this Part represent pure occupational misconduct that provides no organizational
benefits, as opposed to organizational misconduct that provides subtle but tangible benefits to the organizational enterprise. If these behaviors do provide such benefits, then the legal regime’s assumption
that internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to curb agent
misconduct will suffice to correct this behavior is erroneous.
(c) Financial Fraud
Financial fraud is particularly difficult to categorize, as the creation of false profitability may benefit shareholder principals under
some circumstances and not in others. Some instances of financial
fraud undoubtedly harm shareholders. Indeed, in many cases, defrauding shareholders is the ultimate goal of the fraudulent scheme.
In addition, when financial fraud is engaged in for the purpose of
concealing poor management or creating the illusion that some division is profitable when it is actually a drain on organizational resources and should be sold, shareholders are harmed.131
At the same time, however, some well-known instances of financial fraud were the result of attempts by organizational management
to create the appearance of profitability in order to derive some benefit—for example, outside funding—that would augment shareholder
wealth. For instance, alleged Kidder Peabody “rogue trader” Joseph
Jett contended that Kidder management had full knowledge of and
encouraged his fictitious trades because they created the temporary
illusion that Kidder’s trading operations were profitable. This allowed Kidder to obtain a large loan from Union Bank of Switzerland
that Kidder badly needed to provide operating capital.132
Similarly, part of the asserted rationale for Enron’s false financial
statements was that revealing the truth about its financial condition
would result in a credit-rating downgrade, severely hampering its
ability to conduct its derivatives business and undermining Enron’s
profitability and share price.133 In addition, Enron’s fraudulent reporting regarding its trading floor operations was reportedly undertaken to enhance its share price. In other words, the allegation is
that Enron smoothed the volatility of its trading floor profits, thus
131. This is true even if a short-term shareholder owning stock only in that company
would benefit from an inflated stock price. Because most shares in large companies are
owned by diversified shareholders who trade securities fairly actively, portfolio value
should be enhanced by accurate reporting, even if the value of an individual stock would be
temporarily enhanced by false reporting.
132. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
133. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275, 1323-24 (2002).
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making the company appear less risky than it was and, correspondingly, enhancing share price.134
B. Public Choice Reasons
In prior work, I have presented evidence that public choice theory
may explain some of the legal system’s extreme reliance on internal
compliance structures as a liability determinant.135 According to the
interest group branch of public choice theory, well-organized interest
groups are able to extract benefits from the government while imposing the costs on less organized groups, typically broad-based segments of the general public, such as consumers.136
It may seem surprising that business interests—one of the most
organized, effective, and well-financed interest groups involved in the
political process—have not defeated the development of organizational liability provisions (and the recent proliferation of organizational criminal liability provisions, in particular). Given the success
that business interests frequently demonstrate in defeating the implementation of legal rules that they consider onerous, organizational
liability provisions thus present—at first glance—a bit of a mystery.
In other words, why have business interests not blocked the passage
of organizational liability provisions such as those discussed in this
Article?
Although several potential explanations are plausible, one obvious
answer is that organizational liability provisions are not as costly to
business organizations as they may at first appear.137 Although business interests and those who could face personal liability for organizational violations (such as boards of directors under In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Litigation138) would presumably prefer
to suffer no organizational liability for the conduct of employee
agents, a legal regime that conditions or mitigates liability on the ba134. Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48
VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1260 (2003); see also Patrick Barta & John D. McKinnon, Freddie May
Have Understated Profits by up to $4.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2003, at C1 (discussing disclosures by Freddie Mac that it violated accounting rules and, in some cases, understated profits in order to smooth volatility in earnings).
135. See Krawiec, supra note 21.
136. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971). Another branch of public choice theory, voting theory, is based on the work of
Kenneth Arrow and holds that determinations based on majority rule may give rise to random or shifting outcomes, a process known as “cycling.” KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
137. Organizational liability provisions may also reflect an agency cost problem. If the
presence of organizational liability results in a lower probability of personal liability for
corporate officers and directors, then organizational liability may represent an attempt by
officers and directors to deflect their personal liability onto organizational defendants.
Khanna, supra note 8, at 1253-55.
138. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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sis of internal compliance structures—while expensive and wasteful—is far less onerous than actually altering current business practices or paying damages for agent misconduct. As a result, when the
public outcry for constraints on organizational misconduct becomes
too loud for lawmakers to ignore, business interests may agree to
heightened organizational liability in exchange for a “safe harbor” in
the form of mitigation based on internal compliance structures.139
At the same time, legal compliance professionals benefit immensely—both financially and in terms of their importance and
status within organizations—from a legal regime that conditions liability on the presence of internal compliance structures. Perhaps for
this reason, legal compliance professionals have been at the forefront
of the push to adopt internal compliance structures, sometimes overstating to a significant degree both the risks of a failure to adopt
such structures and the benefits of having such structures in place.140
Although both business organizations and legal compliance professionals have had a substantial impact on the development of internal compliance-based legal regimes in the United States, the two
groups have made that impact in different ways. For example, business organizations (including the Business Roundtable) lobbied hard
for an internal compliance-based mitigation of sentences under the
OSG.141 By contrast, legal compliance professionals appear to have
satisfied their agenda more indirectly and have played a particularly
important role in the development of judicially crafted internal compliance-based liability standards.
The judicial recognition of internal compliance-based liability defenses follows a particular pattern that highlights the important role
played by legal compliance professionals in the development of common law compliance-based organizational liability standards. First,
the tendency of legal compliance professionals to overstate both a
new legal risk and their ability to contain that risk through internal
139. See Khanna, supra note 5, at 102-03 (querying why business interests have not
managed to extract such a safe harbor). This public outcry may be especially likely to occur
following the disclosure of a series of corporate misdeeds during a weak economic period.
Id. at 104. For example, commentators have explained the political climate leading to the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on exactly these grounds. See, e.g., id.
140. See Krawiec, supra note 21 (describing this literature); Bisom-Rapp, supra note
58, at 134-40 (describing this trend in connection with sexual harassment training); BisomRapp, Ounce, supra note 76, at 13-15 (same).
141. William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 741, 746 tbl.2 (1993) (providing figures on the lobbying activity of the Business Roundtable, National Association of
Manufacturers, Chamber of Commerce, numerous corporations, and other interested public and private groups in connection with the OSG); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 370
(discussing pressure from the business community to adopt guidelines that account for organizations’ internal compliance efforts).
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compliance structures has been well documented.142 Several studies,
for example, have documented the extent to which legal and management journals overstated the legal benefits of internal grievance
procedures in defending against liability in sexual harassment suits
and the need for personnel practices designed to minimize employer
liability in wrongful discharge suits.143 Second, business organizations (either unaware of, or disinterested in, the fact that the rendered advice is incorrect) adopt the legal compliance professionals’
recommendations.144 Third, when faced with liability decisions,
courts look to industry standards to determine whether the organization has met its duty to avoid the harm in question.145 As a result, the
recommendations of internal compliance professionals become a part
of the liability determination and deviations from them result in
costly liability determinations.
At the same time, the solutions to perceived legal problems recommended by legal compliance professionals are more palatable to
management, because they disrupt managerial discretion and current business practice as little as possible. An internal compliancebased regime thus may represent an equilibrium agreement among
business interests, legal compliance professionals, and lawmakers
that satisfies public demands for regulation while doing little to disrupt business practices and enhancing the profitability and impor-

142. See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 529 (discussing the evidence on this); Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997).
143. See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (1992) (studying the extent
to which personnel, legal academic, and legal practitioner journals overstate the legal risk
of wrongful discharge suits); Edelman et al., supra note 60 (studying the impact that legal
compliance professionals had on the development of grievance procedures as a legal defense under sexual harassment law); Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, A Tale of Two Sectors:
The Spread of Anti-Harassment Remedies Among Public and Private Employers 3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (studying the role played by personnel professionals
in the development and acceptance of internal grievance procedures as a defense to organizational liability in sexual harassment cases and concluding that “the legal remedy to
harassment was clearly fashioned by a group with a professional interest in promoting
that remedy”).
144. See Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 143, at 40 (stating that the courts did not lead the
development of legal rules governing the role of grievance procedures as a defense in sexual harassment suits but instead followed what the corporations were doing at the behest
of personnel professionals); Edelman et al., supra note 60, at 451 (documenting the diffusion of internal grievance procedures within organizations prior to the legitimation of the
defense by the courts).
145. Dobbin & Kelley, supra note 143, at 40 (noting that the courts followed and legitimated what business organizations had been doing—adopting internal grievance procedures—rather than fashioning a remedy on their own); Edelman et al., supra note 60, at
440 (noting that, eventually, the Supreme Court legitimated the originally erroneous legal
advice that personnel professionals had rendered regarding grievance procedures by establishing them as part of a two-part affirmative defense).
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tance of another powerful interest group—legal compliance professionals.
VI. THE CHOICE OF VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PARTY
This Article has, for the most part, addressed only the role of organizational liability for agent misconduct. Under some circumstances, however, cogent arguments can be made that senior management or board liability should supplement or substitute for the
organization as the vicariously liable party. Although this Article
does not reject such a possibility, the obstacles to and problems with
this approach should be briefly noted.
First, the limited assets of organizational agents is a commonly
asserted rationale for organizational-level liability in the first
place.146 Although senior managers and board members may have
deeper pockets than lower-level violators, the harm caused by many
acts of organizational misconduct is nonetheless likely to exceed most
individuals’ assets, leading to a failure to fully internalize the costs of
misconduct and, therefore, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct.147
In addition, imposing liability—especially criminal liability—on
an individual who did not actively participate in and was unaware of
the misconduct in question is a rare, but not unheard of, move in the
American legal regime.148 As a result, fairness concerns are likely to
compel courts to impose this type of individual liability only in the
most egregious cases, such as when the court is convinced that management knew about or recklessly determined to remain unaware of
ongoing misconduct. If this is so, then most of the benefits of vicarious liability will be lost and organizational liability will remain a
necessary tool to deter organizational misconduct. Nonetheless, further research into the choice of vicariously liable party is needed.
146. See supra note 6.
147. Although director and officer liability insurance policies may pay for many vicarious liability judgments against officers and directors, because the firm typically pays the
bulk of these premiums, deterrence may still be undermined.
148. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 348 (2003) (noting
that, although collective sanctions may seem natural in tribal or clan-based societies, in
“modern, liberal societies, however, where the relevant moral unit is the individual, punishing groups for the misdeeds of individuals will be regarded with deep skepticism”);
Adam Liptak, The World: My Brother’s Keeper; Is the Group Responsible for the Individual’s Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, § 4, at 5. In contrast, many other cultures hold individuals or groups—for example, family members or fellow villagers—who are not connected to the misconduct responsible on the theory that such groups or individuals may be
better positioned to identify and punish culpable individuals and may be motivated to do so
by the threat of collective liability. Levinson, supra, at 348 (“Group members might be punished not because they are deemed collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control responsible
individuals, and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so.”); Liptak, supra.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In closing, I should emphasize not only this Article’s conclusions
but also what it does not conclude. Specifically, it is not the contention of this Article that internal compliance structures can never play
a role in deterring organizational misconduct. Indeed, internal compliance structures—in the hands of a competent and committed
management team—may play a central role in the organization’s
preventive approach to organizational misconduct, depending on the
size and structure of the specific organization.149 In addition, by emphasizing the important role played by organizational culture and
management commitment to ethical behavior in deterring misconduct, I am not advocating a legal regime in which courts, agencies, or
prosecutors attempt to directly evaluate those factors in assessing
organizational liability for agent misconduct. As with internal compliance structures, legal decisionmakers are unlikely to possess sufficient information to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of these
factors in any reliable way. As a result, I conclude that the U.S. legal
regime’s move away from strict vicarious liability to internal compliance-based liability is unjustified by either theory or empirical evidence.
At the same time, the obstacles to a return to strict vicarious liability are strong and are both theoretical and political. As a theoretical matter, so long as legal academics and legal decisionmakers
continue to view organizational misconduct as a principal-agent
problem which can be fully addressed through better policing and ignore the subtle, but tangible, benefits that may flow to the organizational enterprise from such conduct, the legal system will continue to
gravitate toward solutions that provide incentives for “policing,”
without ever addressing the root causes of organizational misconduct.
As a political matter, the current legal regime may exist not because it effectively addresses organizational misconduct, but because
it satisfies the needs of a variety of powerful interest groups, including business organizations and legal compliance professionals, while
149. See generally Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 72. Very small, centralized organizations may find formal internal compliance structures unnecessary and prohibitively
expensive. Perhaps for this reason, small businesses have expressed some concern that
they are disadvantaged by the OSG requirements, although firm size is taken into account
in the sentencing guidelines. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 8B2.1, cmt.
n.2(C). It is unclear, however, whether many small firms would gain the benefit of the OSG
mitigation provisions, even in the absence of the internal compliance provisions of the
Guidelines. This is because many small organizations sentenced under the Guidelines are
ineligible for sentence mitigation, due to top-management knowledge of or participation in
the misconduct. John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior—The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit, in 1 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2002, at
113, 131 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1317, 2002).
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at the same time addressing the occasional (though increasingly frequent) public outcry for constraints on organizational misbehavior.

